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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ! 
JAMES V. CRESTANI, I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Cas# No. 870525-CA 
t Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of four counts of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
76-6-404 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant was denied effective assistance 
of counsel. 
2. Whether trial counsel's use of a civil statute was 
sound trial strategy and therfore not ineffectiveness. 
3. Whether Jury Instruction No's. 16 and 25 were 
prejudicial and misleading? 
4. Whether the trial court properly instructed the 
jury regarding the culpable mental state of the offense of theft? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Cost. Amend. XIV: 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of 
law - Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
laws. 
Utah Const. Art. I, S VII: 
Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, S XII: 
Section 12. [Rights of accused person.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have 
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the 
offense to alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CftSE 
Defendant, James V. Crestani, was charged with five 
counts of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953, as amended). Defendant was convicted 
of four counts of theft in a jury trial held July 7-10, 1987, in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokiqh, Judge, presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Rokich on October 23, 1987, to 
four concurrent sentences of not less than one nor more than 15 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1980, Defendant became the sole stockholder of Alta 
Title Company (T. 503). Sometime thereafter, defendant opened 
several bank accounts for Alta Title at the Sandy State Bank (T. 
503, 505). Although the exact number of corporate accounts is 
unclear, there were, apparently, three corporate accounts and one 
personal account of defendant's at the Sandy State Bank (T. 275). 
The record in this case has four volumes of trial transcripts, 
the court record file, and four supplemental transcripts. The 
trial transcripts are numbered from 1 to 615, the record's file 
from 1 to 505, and each of the four supplemental transcripts 
begin on page "1". In order to avoid confusion, the State will 
refer to the original trial transcript as (T. ), the court record 
file as (R. ), and each supplemental transcript by the record and 
page number(R* , p. ) # 
At least one of the corporate accounts was a "Money 
Market Demand" account which was referred to as "MMD-2" (T. 56, 
70). The initial deposit into MMD-2 was on February 9, 1982 (T. 
145). MMD-2 was not a personal account, but a commercial account 
(T. 68-69). MMD-2, however, was used by the defendant for 
several purposes (T. 428). It was used as an escrow account, (T. 
130, 143, 510), as a deposit account for contract service fees 
which defendant claimed were his personal fees (T. 146-47, 267, 
536), and for personal deposits of defendant (T. 410, 415). 
MMD-2 was an active account which in February, 1982 had 
a closing balance of $132,448.63 (T. 429). The following table 
lists the deposits and withdrawals for the relevant months of 
March through August of 1982: 
MONTH DEPOSITS WITHDRAWALS 
March $1,066,883.23 $1,138,335.95 
April 1,623,808.64 1,438,912.00 
May 759,193.15 783,662.79 
June 2,635,507.50 2,818,662.54 
July 2,154,433.83 1,907,506.73 
August 1,208,787.09 1,492,514.89 
(T. 430-31). Despite these large deposits, the withdrawals 
eventually became greater. MMD-2 was consistently overdrawn and 
eventually caused American Title Insurance Company, who 
underwrote Alta Title, to pay between $250,000 to $300,000 in 
claims against Alta Title Company (T. 57-58, 144-242). More than 
half of these claims were attributed to the MMD-2 account. Id. 
During the months of May, June, and August of 1982, 
defendant's personal bank account was also continually overdrawn 
(T. 79, 84, 97). Funds were occasionally transferred from MMD-2 
to defendant's personal account or were simply withdrawn from 
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MMD-2 (T. 77-78, 81, 94). The first such instance occurred on 
May 7, 1982, when defendant telephoned Cleo Rasmussen, the then 
vice-president of Sandy State Bank, and asked her to prepare a 
withdrawal of $4,000 in cash from the MMD-2 account (T. 24-25) 
(State's Exhibit 3; Appendix A). Defendant sent two runners to 
the bank who picked up the cash and delivered it to defendant (T. 
14, 130-33). Defendant testified that he used some of these 
funds for employee bonuses, including himself (T. 530). 
Again, on May 19, 1982, defendant telephoned Ms. 
Rasmussen and requested that $20,000 be transferred from MMD-2 to 
his personal account (T. 76-77). Ms. Rasmussen perceived the 
transfer as "highly irregular" and documented the transfer "as 
per Mr. Crestani 5/19/82 2:30 p" (T. 76) ^State's Exhibit 4; 
Appendix A). 
A third transfer occurred on Jur^ e 11, 1982, when 
defendant personally appeared at the bank, made out a counter 
check from MMD-2 to himself in the amount of $16,800, and then 
deposited $16,000 into his personal account, keeping $800 in cash 
(T. 80-82, 106) (State's Exhibit 5; Appendix A). 
The last transfer occurred on August 13, 1983, when 
defendant authorized $16,500 to be transferred from MMD-2 to his 
personal account (T. 94) (State's Exhibit 6; Appendix A). 
Sometime in June, 1982, defendant hired an accountant, 
Roger Piburn, who later became the controller of Alta Title (T. 
138-40). In November, 1982, Piburn made an accounting of the 
MMD-2 account because it was consistently being overdrawn (T. 
144). Piburn understood that MMD-2 was an escrow account (T. 
143). Piburn was curious why MMD-2 was consistently being 
overdrawn, because, as Piburn testified, "an escrow account is 
simply funds that we take in from a buyer and distribute exactly 
the same amount that we take in, and there should be no 
fluctuation in how much we take in from what we distribute." (T. 
144, 242.) 
Piburn went back to February 9, 1982, when the account 
was opened, and matched the disbursements with the deposits 
through November, 1982 (T. 144, 153). By using the bank 
statements and check vouchers, Piburn found there were 
disbursements without corresponding deposits (T. 148, 162). Each 
escrow deposit and disbursement had a reference number so Piburn 
was able to match them up (T. 149). 
2 
According to Piburn, there were three withdrawals that 
had no corresponding deposits (T. 149). The three withdrawals 
were on May 19, 1982, for $20,000; June 11, 1982, for $16,800; 
and August 13, 1982, for $16,500 (T. 76-78, 80-81, 94-95, 149). 
In December of 1982, Piburn spoke with defendant about 
the three withdrawals (T. 150). Defendant told Piburn that there 
was enough money in the account to cover the withdrawals (T. 
150). Piburn went back and attempted to identify sufficient 
monies in MMD-2 to cover the withdrawals, but could find none (T. 
150, 151). Piburn then re-examined the auditing records, the 
On re-direct, Piburn stated there were four disbursements that 
did not have corresponding deposits (T. 243). Later, he noted 
that there were actually six to eight items, totalling over 
$90,000, which were brought to his attention (T. 243-45). 
individual transactions, and the bank statements to see if he had 
made a mistake (T. 151). In Piburn's accounting of MMD-2, he 
found only escrow funds or Badgen Contracting Servicing fees to 
be contained in MMD-2 (T. 152-53)• Although Piburn testified 
that he knew defendant had personal money in the account, he also 
testified that he took that money into consideration when he 
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performed the accounting of MMD-2 (T. 242), 
Piburn also found that MMD-2 was an interest bearing 
account with interest deposited directly into MMD-2 by the bank 
(T. 157). Piburn was able to account for all of the interest in 
MMD-2 (T. 158). To the best of his recollection "that interest 
was put into the general fund as income" (T. 157). The general 
fund account and MMD-2 were separate accounts (T. 251). 
Lastly, Piburn found that defendant made weekly 
withdrawals from $500 to $1,000 in cash and placed it "in his 
pocket- (T. 251-52). 
At trial, defendant attempted to show that he had 
deposited personal money in MMD-2 sufficient to cover the 
withdrawals in question. Defendant called James Mclntyre, the 
attorney for Alta Title (T. 340). Mclntyre testified that 
defendant had personal money in MMD-2 (T. 348-49). Mclntyre 
recalled one specific occurrence where defendant's personal funds 
were deposited in MMD-2 (T. 342). However, on cross-examination, 
Mclntyre admitted that he really did not know if they were 
personal funds, he merely assumed that they were (T. 352). 
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Piburn's original testimony was that there was no personal 
money in MMD-2, but on cross-examination, Piburn stated that it 
seemed like there were some personal transactions placed in the 
Vicki Crestani, defendant's wife, also testified that 
defendant had deposited personal money in MMD-2. She claimed 
that there were two deposits of $100,000 each in which 
defendant's personal money was placed in MMD-2 (T. 419). Also, 
there was a personal loan for $17,082 to purchase a boat that was 
deposited in MMD-2 (R. 414-15). Additionally, she stated that 
two deposits, one for $15,000 and another for $19,896.53, were 
placed into MMD-2 and were defendant's personal funds (T. 410). 
Furthermore, she said there were a number of $50 deposits (as 
many as 1800) into MMD-2 which were agency fees due defendant (T. 
411). Lastly, she alluded to a deposit of personal funds into 
MMD-2 for about $8,000 (T. 412). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mrs. 
Crestani to pinpoint where in the MMD-2 records were any deposits 
for exactly $100,000 (T. 425). The witness could not find a 
deposit for $100,000 (T. 425). The witness also could not 
explain a $17,082 withdrawal from MMD-2 which occurred just two 
days after the $17,082 was deposited, payable to Alta Title, not 
defendant (T. 437-38). Mrs. Crestani further admitted that the 
$15,000 she claimed was defendant's personal money was withdrawn 
the same day it was deposited into MMD-2 (T. 471). Likewise, the 
prosecution established that $19,869.73 was withdrawn from MMD-2 
the same day it was deposited (T. 475-76). 
Finally, the prosecution admitted two check drafts from 
MMD-2, made payable to Alta Title Company, not defendant, which 
were for "Agent Fees" and deposited into other accounts (T. 481, 
483). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to establish, under the Strickland 
test# that trial counsels' preparation airid representation fell 
below the standard of objective reasonableness guaranteed by the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. D0fendant's claim of 
prejudice is purely speculative and is thus insufficient under 
the Strickland test. Because trial counsel's claimed 
ineffectiveness can be considered sound trial strategy, 
defendant's ineffective claim must fail. 
Trial counsel's offering of a civil statute into 
evidence was trial strategy consistent with the defense asserted 
by counsel. Therefore, trial counsel's tactical decision cannot 
be grounds for ineffectiveness. 
Considering the jury instructions as a whole, 
Instruction No's. 16 and 25 were not misleading or prejudicial, 
but rather, were helpful to the jury in determining whether 
defendant was authorized to withdraw escrow funds for personal 
use. Under the circumstances, Instruction No. 25 was not 
confusing or misleading to the extent that the jury disregarded 
their duty to find each and every element pf the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the 
required culpable mental state of the offense of theft and 
therefore did not err in refusing to give defendant's proffered 
-specific intent" instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
Defendant argues that defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel at trial because defense counsel failed to 
obtain and examine all available evidence critical to his 
defense. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
"it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) that this counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and 
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different but for counsel's error." State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 
645, 646 (Utah 1985); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-04 (Utah 1984), 
overruled on other grounds, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987) 
(adopting Strickland test). Failure to show either deficient 
performance or resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of 
ineffective counsel. State v. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646. 
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court discuss 
the various aspects of the test in order to assist courts in 
Although defendant does not cite to any constitutional 
provisions in the argument portion of his brief, the State 
assumes that defendant asserts a violation of the United States 
Constitution Amendments VI and XIV, and Utah Constitution Article 
I SS 7 and 12, based upon defendant's "Determinative 
Constitutional Provisions" section of his brief (Br. of App. at 
2). 
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applying the test to cases. 
When a convicted defendant complains of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the 
defendant must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
The proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms. 
Representation of a criminal defendant 
entails certain basic duties. Counsel's 
function is to assist the defendant, and 
hence counsel owes the client a duty of 
loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest. . . . From counsel's function as 
assistant to the defendant derive the 
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's 
cause and the more particular duties to 
consult with the defendant on important 
decisions and to keep the defendant informed 
of important developments in the course of 
the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to 
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as 
will render the trial a reliable adversarial 
testing process. . . . 
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness 
claim, the performance inquiry must be 
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances. . . . The 
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial. 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential. It is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second guess 
counsel's assistance after conviction or 
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for 
a court, examining counsel's defense after it 
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every 
effort be made to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time. Because 
of the difficulties inherent in making the 
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged 
action "might be considered sound trial 
strategy." . . . There are countless ways to 
provide effective assistance in any given 
case. Even the best criminal defense 
attorneys would not defend a particular 
client in the same way. . . . 
The availability of intrusive post-trial 
inquiry into attorney performance or of 
detailed guidelines for its evaluation would 
encourage the proliferation of ineffective-
ness challenges. Criminal trials resolved 
unfavorably to the defendant would 
increasingly come to be followed by a second 
trial, this one of counsel's unsuccessful 
defense. . . • 
Thus, a court deciding an actual 
ineffectiveness claim must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged 
conduct on the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. 
A convicted defendant making a claim of 
ineffective assistance must identify the acts 
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not 
to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. The court must then 
determine whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, the identified acts or 
omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. In 
making that determination, the court should 
keep in mind that counsel's function, as 
elaborated in prevailing professional norms, 
is to make the adversarial testing process 
work in the particular case. At the same 
time, the court should recognize that counsel 
is strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment. 
An error by counsel, even if 
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant 
setting aside the judgment of a criminal 
proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment. • . • 
• • • • 
Representation is an art, and an act or 
omission that is unprofessional in one case 
may be sound or even brilliant in another. 
Even if a defendant shows that particular 
errors of counsel were unreasonable, 
therefore, the defendant must show that they 
actually had an adverse effect on the 
defense. 
It is not enough for the defendant to show 
that the errors had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome of the proceeding. • • . 
. . . . 
The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 
. . . . 
When a defendant challenges a conviction, the 
question is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt. . . . 
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly 
supported by the record is more likely to 
have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support. . . . 
In every case the court should be concerned 
with whether, despite the strong presumption 
of reliability, the result of the particular 
proceeding is unreliable because of a 
breakdown in the adversarial process that our 
system counts on to produce just results. 
466 U.S. at 687-96 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court most recently reitterated its 
adoption of the Strickland test in State v. Archuletaf 747 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1987)i 
Before this Court will consider whether 
specific conduct falls below the required 
standard of objective reasonableness, the 
person arguing ineffective assistance must 
show that the conduct prejudiced his case. 
[Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 
2069; see also State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 
405 (Utah 1986). In order to prove prejudice 
to his case, "defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 
S.Ct. at 1028. . . . 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023. 
Defendant, in Point I of his brief, asserts that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for two reasons. First, he failed 
to adequately investigate Alta Title's bank records and as a 
result both he and his witnesses were unprepared for trial. 
Second, trial counsel failed to call a key witness for the 
defense. 
Regarding the first claim, defendant asserts that 
because trial counsel failed to obtain and examine all of Alta 
Title's bank records, he was unaware of facts that may have 
provided a complete defense to Count IV of the Information. 
Defendant cites to an examination report of Alta Title's bank 
records performed after trial by Leland Martineau, C.P.A. 
At the hearing on defendant's Motion for New Trial, 
Martineau testified that personal money of defendant was 
available in MMD-2 that would have covered the last withdrawal of 
$16,500 (Count IV) (T. 510, p. 28-30). The basis of the "newly 
discovered" funds was an alleged repayment of a personal loan (R. 
510, p. 29-30). Apparently, defendant loaned $24,000 to a Mr. 
i A _ 
Ray Fry. Jd. ^he repayment of the loan/ plus interest, totalled 
$24,622.50 which was deposited in MMD-2. Id. On cross-
examination, however, Martineau admitted that he did not know 
whether the Source of the loan was from defendant's personal 
money or not (R. 51^, p. 32). Hence, the loan repayment deposit 
may or may not have been personal funds. 
r t
 is well-established that proof of inadequate 
representation »• . . . must be a demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative natter.'" Codianna v. Morris|, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 
(Utah 1983) (quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 
1976)). Because defendant's claim is based upon speculation, 
defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof, which is, "but 
for counsel'a unprofessional errors, the tesult of the proceeding 
would have bsen different." Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023. 
Simply, ther^ ^s n o evidence that due to ^rial counsel's alleged 
failure to r^view an 0f the bank records, defendant's cause was 
prejudiced. 
I n
 an effort to show that he lacked the requisite 
intent, defendant argues that he made some deposits into MMD-2 
which were withdrawn prior to the withdrawals charged in the 
Information ancj that "the CPA found evidence that [defendant] may 
not have known o f ali o f [the] withdrawals." (Br. of App. at 27) 
(emphasis addedj. Additionally, defendant claims that other 
money was deposited in MMD-2 which may or ntay not have been 
withdrawn and he asserts that he "may have reasonably believed 
that that money w a s available to cover [the] withdrawals . . . ." 
(Br. of App.
 a t 27) (emphasis added). 
Again, defendant offers nothing but mere speculation 
that he may have believed money was available to cover the 
personal withdrawals from MMD-2. This speculation is the basis 
of defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. 
Defendant's mere speculation is a far cry from "affirmatively 
show[ing] that a 'reasonable probability' exists that, but for 
counsel's error, the result would have been different." State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant also asserts that if trial counsel had 
reviewed Alta Title's bank records, trial counsel could have used 
the records to refresh the memory of the defendant and his wife. 
Defendant then speculates that if that had been done, "they would 
likely not have been made out to look like liars in front of the 
jury" (Br. of App. at 32) (emphasis added). 
In his attempt to establish prejudice, defendant merely 
asserts that, maybe, the jury would have viewed his and his 
wife's testimony more favorably had their memory been more 
completely refreshed. Again, defendant fails to establish a 
"demonstrable reality" rather than a "speculative matter" as 
required in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1109. 
In Commonwealth v. Sellon, 402 N.E.2d 1329 (Mass. 
1980), the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: 
Moreover, even if trial counsel wholly 
failed to prepare his witnesses, Sellon has 
failed to demonstrate any "issue of fact or 
law that [as a result] could have been but 
was not exploited by counsel for the 
defendant's benefit in the original 
proceedings." . . . Even if a defendant 
demonstrates a deficiency in pretrial 
preparation, "the defendant [can] make no 
headway in the absence of a showing that the 
fault probably resulted in forfeiture of a 
substantial defense." 
Sellon, 402 N.E.2d at 1335-36 (citations omitted). In the 
present case, defendant does not assert he lost a substantial 
defense nor that "any issue of law or facft could have but was not 
exploited by counsel for the defendant's benefit." Id. (See 
alsof State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 15 Mass. App. 692, 448 N.E.2d 400 (1983); 
State v. Long, 726 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1986). Clearly, trial 
counsel's defense strategy was that defendant's personal money 
was available in the MMD-2 account and th&t defendant therefore, 
did not intend to deprive others of their money. Therefore, 
defendant's present claim of ineffectiveness can be disposed of 
as sound trial strategy which cannot be grounds for reversal. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. 
Finally, defendant asserts that trial counsel failed to 
call a key witness who would have possibly discredited the 
prosecutions accountant witness. In Commonwealth v. Rondeauf 392 
N.E.2d 1001 (Mass. 1979), the Massachusetts Supreme Court said, 
M[i]neffectives is not established simply by showing that 
[counsel] failed to call an additional witness . . . to bolster 
the defense case." Rondeau, 392 N.E.2d at 1004. The Utah 
Supreme Court said, M[t]he calling of witnesses is a matter of 
judgment on the part of a lawyer." Batchelor v, Smith, 555 P.2d 
871, 872 (Utah 1976). Defendant fails to assert in his brief how 
the testimony of Blake Hammond would discredit the State's 
witness or how he was prejudiced by the absence of the testimony. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to establish prejudice resulting 
from any alleged ineffectiveness in trial counsel's decision to 
not call Hammond as a witness. 
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland said that the proper standard for attorney performance 
is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the 
circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Utah Supreme 
Court has further stated that a defendant: 
is entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent with 
the ethics of the profession. 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
In People v. McGautha, 452 P.2d 650, 76 Cal.Rptr. 434 
(1969), aff'd, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the court stated, "in inquiry 
whether defendant received his constitutional right to 'effective 
aid in the preparation and trial of the case' . . . we do not 
attempt to measure such elusive qualities as the vigor of a 
defense counsel's efforts." McGautha, 452 P.2d at 659 (citation 
omitted). "The purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that 
defendant receives a fair trial." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
Defendant must show that the "adversarial process of the trial 
was so undermined that the jury could not have produced a just 
result.- Id. 
In the present case, there is no question that trial 
counsel is "a competent member of the bar." Id. He has been a 
member of the bar since 1950, a former Utah Attorney General, a 
seasoned criminal defense attorney, and a former municipal judge 
in the Murray City court (R. 327). There is also no question 
that trial counsel showed a willingness to identify himself with 
the interests of defendant and presented such defenses as were 
available. 
In State v. Neal, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
[Defendant's] attorney made pretrial motions, 
called witnesses in the defendant's behalf, 
and adequately cross-examined t^ he State's 
witnesses. [Defendant's] representation did 
not reach the level where he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. 
State v. Nealf 143 Ariz. 93, 692 P.2d 272, 280 (1984). Here, 
trial counsel gave vigorous cross-examination to the state's 
witnesses (T. 58, 99, 123, 133, 163, 252, 271, 277, 297, 306, 
308, 396), made numerous objections throughout the trial (T. 46, 
71, 97, 141-42, 276, 295, 336, 403, 480, 485),5 and made strong 
arguments concerning the admissibility of evidence outside the 
presence of the jury (T. 47, 86, 204, 380, 440, 452, 455, 543). 
In evaluating trial counsel's effectiveness, the trial court 
observed as follows: 
As I sat through the case, I'm not so sure 
that had they put on all the documentary 
evidence it would have altered the outcome of 
the case. I think there was some very 
damaging evidence that gave rise to the 
credibility of the defendant when he got on 
the stand and testified. 
(R. 512, p. 23). The Court further observed: 
The one thing that keeps going through my 
mind during all these hearings is the fact 
that no one has ever taken into account the 
testimony of the defendant and his wife. I 
The cited objections by no means contain all of the objections 
made by trial counsel during trial. They do, however, illustrate 
the amount of zealousness that trial counsel exhibited during the 
four day trial. 
mean, as I sat through this trial, that might 
have been the most damaging issue in this 
whole case, was the testimony of those two. . . . 
You stated before that they weren't 
coherent. Well, they were so glib in their 
answers, and that, I think, was a major 
factor of this case. It was not a lack of 
preparation as I reviewed all of this. It 
was not the lack of preparation. 
(R. 510, p. 38-39). The Court's comments initiated the following 
dialogue: 
MR. CLARK: Of course, Judge, I wasn't 
there, but it seems to me that 
when Mrs. Crestani was 
confronted on the stand by Mr. 
Bown with checks that directly 
contradicted her previous 
testimony that she deposited 
monies to cover those charged 
events, I'm sure she wasn't 
glib then. She must have sat 
back in her chair and 
swallowed her tongue. 
THE COURT: That wasn't the case, 
was the problem. 
That 
As I say, that element during 
this whole proceeding has been 
eliminated. So, I don't know 
how you can go about 
correcting your testimony. 
Id. 
Applying the facts of this case to the test set forth 
in Strickland and followed in Frame, trial counsel's 
representation did not fall below the objective standard of 
reasonableness guaranteed by the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. As noted above, trial counsel vigorously pursued 
the defense now espoused on appeal. Defendant has failed to meet 
his burden of showing ineffectiveness of counsel and prejudice 
caused thereby. Therefore, this Court should find that defendant 
was afforded a fair trial with constitutionally sufficient 
representation of counsel. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S ACTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, BUT RATHER, WERE 
TRIAL STRATEGY. 
Defendant further asserts that trial counsel was 
ineffective because he offered into evidence a civil statute 
which explains the duty of a title insurance agent regarding 
escrow accounts (Utah Code Ann. S 31-25-26 (1981) (Repealed By 
1985 Utah Laws, Ch. 242, S 58)) (T. 413). 
As stated in Point I supra, the defendant must show (1) 
that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would 
probably have been different but for counsel's error. Lairby, 
699 P.2d at 1204. Furthermore, the Court in Strickland said, Ma 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, that defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action, 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy."1 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that M[d]ecisions as 
to . . . what objections to make . . . are generally left to the 
professional judgment of counsel." State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). In State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1982) the Court said, "[t]his Court will not second guess the 
strategy of counsel at trial." Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59. 
Similarly, other jurisdictions have also concluded that 
trial tactics or strategy should be given wide latitude. The 
Colorado Supreme Court stated that the "public defender's 
decision not to object to what the defendant characterizes as 
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence falls within the reach of 
trial strategy.M People v. Bossertf 722 P.2d 998, 1010 (Colo. 
1986). 
In another case, the defendant argued that he was 
"denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial 
attorney emphasized defendant's past history of violence." State 
v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 P.2d 315, 322 (1981). Because the 
defendant's emotional state was one of the few arguments that 
defendant's attorney could logically present with any hope of 
success trial counsel chose to admit that evidence in an attempt 
to support the insanity defense presented at trial. Ld. at 322-
23. The Court concluded that his decision was a legitimate trial 
tactic, and "'[m]atters of trial strategy and tactics are 
committed to defense counsel's judgment, and claims of 
ineffective assistance cannot be predicated thereon.'" Jd. at 
323. 
In the present case, trial counsel, while cross-
examining five of the state's witnesses, asked if they had any 
evidence that defendant exercised any unauthorized control over 
the property of another (T. 58, 99, 133, 199). During 
defendant's case in chief, trial counsel called James Mclntyre, 
the attorney for Alta Title (T. 340). Trial counsel attempted to 
show that it was proper, or at least not illegal, for the 
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defendant to withdraw money from one account and deposit it into 
another (T. 341-43). 
In response to this line of questioning, the state 
showed the witness the statute now in question (T. 355). Trial 
counsel objected to the admittance of th0 statute (T. 366). The 
court took it under advisement (T. 366). As stated above, the 
statute explains that duty of a title insurance agent regarding 
escrow accounts (T. 493). 
Later in the case, Mrs. Crestani testified that the 
defendant was a title insurance agent (T. 462). Trial counsel 
asserted that defendant was not a title insurance agent, but a 
partnership agent (T. 458). In an effort to establish that 
defendant was a partnership agent and not a title insurance 
agent, trial counsel re-called Gary Carlson (T. 491). Mr. 
Carlson then explained that the defendant was an agent for out-
of-state partnerships (T. 491). Trial counsel then admitted the 
civil statute (T. 493). The following dialogue between trial 
counsel and Mr. Carlson occurred: 
Q: (By Mr. Hansen) All right. Now, again 
that statute applies to the agent that 
issues the title insurance policy saying 
that the title of the property is okay? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Now, I think you said there was another 
type of a dealing with partnerships? 
A: Right. 
Q: Does that have anything at £ll to do with 
this [statute]? 
A: No. 
Q: Now, relative to the act that pertains to 
out-of-state partnerships and other 
designations, will you explain that act 
as opposed to the act or the statute that 
you have before you? 
A: Well, an out-of-state partnership has to 
have some individual in the state that's 
able to service the partnership itself. 
Q: Is that your understanding of the 
capacity in which Mr. Crestani acts? 
A: Yes. 
Q: As in the partnership? 
A: Yes. 
(T. 493-95). 
Clearly, trial counsel's strategy was to show that 
defendant did not exercise unauthorized control over another's 
property. When the testimony came forth that defendant may be an 
agent, the State presented a civil statute to a defense witness 
to show that the statute restricted what a title insurance agent 
could do with escrow money. The State attempted to have the 
statute admitted, trial counsel objected, and the court took it 
under advisement. Trial counsel then made a tactical decision to 
offer the statute to show that defendant was not a title 
insurance agent, but a partnership agent. As such, the fiduciary 
responsibility set out in the civil statute did not apply to the 
defendant. 
Trial counsel's actions were clearly strategic. By 
claiming that the defendant was not a title insurance agent, he 
furthered his defense that he did not exercise unauthorized 
control over another's money which "was one of the few arguments 
that defendant's attorney could logically present with any hope 
of success." Vickers, 633 P.2d at 323. Because trial counsel's 
actions were trial strategy, they cannot be considered 
ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. 
POINT III 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO'S. 16 AND 25 WERE NOT 
MISLEADING OR PREJUDICIAL WHEN CONSIDERING 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOI^ E. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving 
Jury Instruction No's. 16 and 25 because they were misleading and 
unfairly prejudicial. The challenged jury instructions read as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You are instructed that the laws of the 
State of Utah applicable at the pertinent 
times in this case provide that a title 
insurance agent may engage in the escrow, 
settlement or closing business, or any 
combination of such business, and operate as 
escrow, settlement or closing agent provided 
that all funds deposited with the agent in 
connection with any escrow, settlement or 
closing shall be deposited in a bank in a 
separate trust account, or accounts and such 
funds shall be the property of the person or 
persons entitled thereto under provisions of 
the escrow, settlement or closing and 
segregate escrow by escrow, settlement by 
settlement, or closing by closing in the 
records of the agent. These fur^ ds shall not 
be subject to any debt of the agent and shall 
be used only to fulfill the terms of the 
individual escrow, settlement or closing 
under which the funds were accepted, and none 
of the funds shall be used until all 
conditions of the escrow, settlement or 
closing have been met. 
Any interest received or funds deposited 
with the agent in connection with any escrow, 
settlement or closing which are deposited in 
a bank shall be paid over to the depositing 
party to the escrow, settlement or closing 
and shall not be transferred to the account 
of the agent. 
(R. 140.) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
You are instructed that if you find that 
the MMD-2 account was used as an escrow 
account then the defendant had no authority 
to use the funds of another for his own use. 
(R. 149.) 
In considering whether a jury instruction was proper, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
As we have reiterated innumberable times one 
instruction should not be considered in 
isolation in order to predicate a claim of 
error upon it, but the instructions must be 
read and understood as a connected whole. 
Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 20, 414 P.2d 575, 577 (1966) 
(footnote omitted). The Court has further added: 
the law in Utah is that jury instructions are 
to be considered as a whole. . . . When 
taken as a whole, if they fairly tender the 
case to the jury, the fact that one or more 
of the instructions, standing alone, are not 
as full or accurate as they might have been 
is not reversible error. 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
Defendant, in the instant case, claims that the 
challenged instructions, standing alone, led the jury to look for 
civil misconduct, which eventually led them to believe that 
defendant was guilty of the criminal charges. Defendant ignores 
that the challenged instructions were relevant to prove the 
element of unauthorized control over another's property. In 
Theft is defined as follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
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fact, as mentioned in Point II, the defense offered the civil 
statute (Utah Code Ann. S 31-25-26 (1981)) in an attempt to show 
that defendant was not a title insurance agent, and therefore, 
was not statutorily restricted in exercising control over the 
account. Therefore, Instruction No. 16 was not misleading, but 
rather, helpful to the jury in determining whether defendant 
exercised unauthorized control over the MMD-2 escrowed funds. 
Further, there was testimony at trial that MMD-2 was 
not solely an escrow account (T. Ill, 239, 292, 353, 426, 511). 
Therefore, a critical question of fact existed whether the MMD-2 
monies used by defendant were his own or were escrowed funds of 
others. Thus, Instruction No. 25 was given to clarify to the 
jury that they must determine whether defendant used escrow 
monies of other persons without proper authorization. 
Defendant further claims that Instruction No. 25 was 
flawed in that it may create a rebuttable presumption that if the 
jury finds MMD-2 to be an escrow account, then they must find 
that defendant exercised unauthorized control over property of 
another. Defendant's claim strains common-sense and ignores the 
fundamental principle that jury instructions must be reviewed as 
a whole. 
The jury heard extensive testimpny from both the state 
and defense on the issue of whether the monies used by defendant 
were his personal funds or those of another. The jury was 
further instructed that in order to convict defendant, they must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) obtained or 
Cont. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) (emphasis added). 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another, (2) 
that he did so with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and 
(3) that such property exceeded $1,000 in value (R. 141; Jury 
Instruction No. 17). Clearly, taking the instructions as a whole 
in the context of the present case, the jury could not have been 
sufficiently confused or mislead by Instruction No. 25 to the 
extent that they disregarded their duty to find each and every 
element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, defendant claims that a "perverse synergistic 
effect" occurred by the combination of Instruction No's. 16 and 
25. Because, as argued above, the jury instructions, when taken 
as a whole, were not confusing or misleading, the combination of 
any individual instructions cannot be said to be misleading. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
REGARDING THE CULPABLE MENTAL STATE OF THEFT 
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred 
by refusing to give a "specific intent" instruction. Defendant's 
claim is clearly without merit. 
7 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 
39, 43 (Utah 1987) explained that: 
The terms "general intent" and "specific 
intent" are no longer used in our present 
criminal code which refers to "culpable 
mental states." U.C.A., 1953, S 76-2-102 
provides as follows: 
Apparently, West Publishing Co. inadvertently mistitled the 
case of State v. Whitehair, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 
filed 3/23/87) as State v. Calimity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987). 
Mr. Calimity was a co-defendant of Mr. Whitehair, was acquitted, 
and did not appeal. JId. at 40. 
Every offense not involving 
strict liability shall require 
a culpable mental state, and 
when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the 
offense does not involve 
strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility. 
As noted earlier, the offense of theft is defined as 
follows: 
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978). The statute further defines a 
"purpose to deprive" as follows: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently 
or for so extended a period or to use 
under such circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, 
or of the use and benefit thereof, would 
be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; 
or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-401(3) (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
culpable mental state of theft is a "purpdse to deprive" as 
further defined in the statute. 
In the present case, the jury was instructed regarding 
the meaning of the term "purpose to deprive.M 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object to withhold property 
permanently or for so extended a period or to 
use under such circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, or 
of the use and benefit thereof, would be 
lost; or to dispose of property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
(R. 38; Jury Instruction No. 14). The culpable mental state of 
theft being set forth in the elements of the offense, and clearly 
defined for the jury, the trial court properly refused to give 
the improper and antiquated "specific intent" instruction offered 
o 
by defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <£>/ ^day of July, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Notably, defense counsel in the present case was also counsel 
in State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987). 
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